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JUSTIFICATION AND THEISM
Alvin Planting a

The question is: how should a theist think of justification or positive epistemic status?
The answer I suggest is: a belief B has positive epistemic status for 8 only if 8's faculties
are functioning properly (i.e., functioning in the way God intended them to) in producing
B, and only if 8's cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which her
faculties are designed; and under those conditions the more firmly 8 is inclined to accept
B, the more positive epistemic status it has for her. I conclude by making some qualifications and applications and exmaining some objections.

According to an ancient and honorable tradition, knowledge is justified true
belief. But what is this "justification"? Theologians of the Protestant Reformation
(however things may stand with their contemporary epigoni) had a clear conception of justification; justification, they held, is by faith. Contemporary epistemologists, sadly enough, do not thus speak with a single voice. They don't
often subject the concept in question-the concept of epistemic justification-to
explicit scrutiny; while there are many discussions of the conditions under which
a person is justified in believing a proposition, there are few in which the principle
topic is the nature of justification. But when they do discuss it, they display a
notable lack of unanimity. Some claim that justification is by epistemic dutifulness, others that it is by coherence, and still others that it is by reliability. I The
differences among these views are enormous; this is by no means a case of
variations on the same theme. Indeed, disagreement is so deep and radical it is
sometimes hard to be sure the various disputants are discussing approximately
the same issue. Now what should a Christian, or more broadly, a theist, make
of this situation? How should such a person react to this baffling welter of
conflict, this babble or Babel of confusion? In what follows I shall try to get a
clearer look at epistemic justification and allied conceptions. In particular, I
propose to examine this topic from an explicitly Christian, or more broadly,
theistic point of view: how shall we think of epistemic justification from a theistic
perspective? What can Christianity or theism contribute to our understanding of
epistemic justification?
But here we need a preliminary word as to what it is, more exactly, I mean
to be talking about. How shall we initially locate epistemic justification? First,
such terms as "justification" and "justified" are, as Roderick Chisholm' suggests,
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terms of epistemic appraisal; to say that a proposition is justified for a person is
to say that his believing or accepting it (here I shall Rot distinguish these two)
has positive epistemic status for him. What we appraise here are a person's
beliefs: more exactly, his believings. Someone's belief that there is such a person
as God may be thus appraised, as well as her belief that human life evolved
from unicellular life by way of the mechanisms suggested by contemporary
evolutionary theory, and the less spectacular beliefs of everyday life. We may
speak of a person's beliefs as warranted, or justified, or rational, or reasonable,
contrasting them with beliefs that are unwarranted, unjustified, irrational, or
unreasonable. The evidentialist objector to theistic belief, for example, argues
that those who believe in God without evidence are unjustified in so doing, and
are accordingly somehow unreasonable-guilty of an intellectual or cognitive
impropriety, perhaps, or, alternatively and less censoriously, victims of some
sort of intellectual dysfunction. Secondly, epistemic justification or positive
epistemic status clearly comes in degrees: at any rate some of my beliefs have
more by way of positive epistemic status for me than others.
And thirdly, among the fundamental concepts of epistemology, naturally
enough, we find the concept of knowledge. It is widely agreed that true belief,
while necessary for knowledge, is not sufficient for it. What more is required?
It is widely agreed, again, that whatever exactly this further element may be, it
is either epistemic justification or something intimately connected with it. Now
it would be convenient just to baptize that quantity as 'justification', thus taking
that term as a proper name of the element, whatever exactly it is, enough of
which (Gettier problems, perhaps, aside) distinguishes knowledge from mere
true belief. The term 'justification', however, has a deontological ring; it is
redolent of duty and permission, obligation and rights. Furthermore, according
to the long and distinguished tradition of Cartesian internalism (represented at
its contemporary best by Roderick Chisholm's work3 ), aptness for epistemic duty
fulfillment is indeed what distinguishes true belief from knowledge; using this
term as a mere proper name of what distinguishes true belief from knowledge,
therefore, can be confusing. Accordingly, I shall borrow Chisholm's term 'positive epistemic status' as my official name of the quantity in question-the quantity
enough of which distinguishes mere true belief from knowledge. (Of course we
cannot initially assume that positive epistemic status is a single or simple property;
perhaps it is an amalgam of several others.) Initially, then, and to a first approximation, we can identify justification or positive epistemic status as a normative
(possibly complex) property that comes in degrees, and which is such that enough
of it (ignoring Gettier problems for the moment) is what distinguishes true belief
from knowledge.
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I. Positive Epistemic Status and Theism

Now how shall we think of positive epistemic status, or, indeed, the whole
human cognitive enterprise, from a Christian or theistic point of view? What
bearing does theism have on the human cognitive enterprise? What features of
theism bear on this topic? The central point, I think, is this: according to the
theistic way of looking at the matter, we human beings, like ropes and linear
accelerators, have been designed; we have been designed and created by God,
We have been created by God; furthermore, according to Christian and Jewish
versions of theism, we have been created by him in his own image; in certain
crucial respects we resemble him. Now God is an actor, an agent, a creator: one
who chooses certain ends and takes action to accomplish them. God is therefore
a practical being. But he is also an intellectual or intellecting being. He has
knowledge; indeed, he has the maximal degree of knowledge. He holds beliefs
(even if his way of holding a belief is different from ours); and because he is
omniscient, he believes every truth and holds only true beliefs. He therefore has
the sort of grasp of concepts, properties and propositions necessary for holding
beliefs; and since he believes every true proposition, he has a grasp of every
property and proposition. 4
In setting out to create human beings in his image, then, God set out to create
them in such a way that they could reflect something of his capacity to grasp
concepts and hold beliefs. Furthermore, as the whole of the Christian tradition
suggests, his aim was to create them in such a way that they can reflect something
of his capacity for holding true beliefs, for attaining knowledge. This has been
the nearly unanimous consensus of the Christian tradition; but it is worth noting
that it is not inevitable. God's aim in creating us with the complicated, highly
articulated establishment of faculties we do in fact display could have been
something quite different; in creating us with these faculties he could have been
aiming us, not at truth, but at something of some other sort-survival, for
example, or a capacity to appreciate art, poetry, beauty in nature,5 or an ability
to stand in certain relationships with each other and with him. But the great bulk
of the tradition has seen our imaging God in tem1S (among other things) of
knowledge: knowledge of ourselves, of God himself, and of the world in which
he has placed us; and here I shall take for granted this traditional understanding
of the image dei.
God has therefore created us with cognitive faculties designed to enable us to
achieve true beliefs with respect to a wide variety of propositions-propositions
about our immediate environment, about our own interior lives, about the thoughts
and experiences of other persons, about our universe at large, about right and
wrong, about the whole realm of abstracta-numbers, properties, propositions,
states of affairs, possible worlds and their like, about modality-what is necessary
and possible-and about himself. These faculties work in such a way that under
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the appropriate circumstances we form the appropriate belief. More exactly, the
appropriate belief is formed in us; in the typical case we do not decide to hold
or form the belief in question, but simply find ourselves with it. Upon considering
an instance of modus ponens, I find myself believing its corresponding conditional; upon being appeared to in the familiar way, I find myself holding the
belief that there is a large tree before me; upon being asked what I had for
breakfast, I reflect for a moment and then find myself with the belief that what
I had was eggs on toast. In these and other cases I do not decide what to believe;
I don't total up the evidence (I'm being appeared to redly; on most occasions
when thus appeared to I am in the presence of something red; so most probably
in this case I am) and make a decision as to what seems best supported; I simply
find myself believing. Of course in some cases I may go through such a procedure.
For example, I may try to assess the alleged evidence in favor of the theory that
human life evolved by means of the mechanisms of random genetic mutation
and natural selection from unicellular life (which itself arose by substantially
similar random mechanical processes from nonliving material); I may try to
determine whether the evidence is in fact compelling or, more modestly, such
as to make the theory plausible. Then I may go through a procedure of that sort.
Even in this sort of case I still don't really decide anything: I simply call the
relevant evidence to mind, try in some way to weight it up, and find myself
with the appropriate belief. But in more typical and less theoretical cases of
belief formation nothing like this is involved.
Experience, obviously enough, plays a crucial role in belief fom1ation. Here
it is important to see, I think, that two rather different sorts of experience are
involved. In a typical perceptual case there is sensuous experience: I look out
at my back yard and am appeared to greenly, perhaps. But in many cases of
belief formation, there is present another sort of experiential component as well.
Consider a memory belief, for example. Here there may be a sort of sensuous
imagery present-I may be appeared to in a certain indistinct fleeting sort of
way in trying to recall what I had for breakfast, for example. But this sort of
sensuous imagery is in a way (as Wittgenstein never tired of telling us) inessential,
variable from person to person, and perhaps in the case of some persons altogether
absent. What seems less variable is a different kind of experience not easy to
characterize: it is a matter, not so much of sensuous imagery, as of feeling
impelled, or inclined, or moved towards a certain belief-in the case in question,
the belief that what I had for breakfast was eggs on toast. (Perhaps it could be
better put by saying that the belief in question has a sort of experienced attractiveness about it, a sort of drawing power.) Consider an a priori belief: if all
men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal. Such a belief
is not, as the denomination a priori mistakenly suggests, formed prior to or in
the absence of experience; it is rather formed in response to experience. Thinking
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of the corresponding conditional of modus ponens feels different from thinking
of, say, the corresponding conditional of affirming the consequent; thinking
of 2+ 1 =3 feels different from thinking of 2+ 1 =4; and this difference in experience is crucially connected with our accepting the one and rejecting the other.
Again, when I entertain or think of an example of modus ponens, there is both
sensuous imagery-Descartes' clarity and distinctness, the luminous brightness
of which Locke spoke; but there is also the feeling of being impelled to believe
or accept the proposition; there is a sort of inevitability about it. (As I said, this
isn't easy to describe.) Of course experience plays a different role here from the
role it plays in the formation of perceptual beliefs; it plays a still different role
in the formation of moral beliefs, beliefs about our own mental lives, beliefs
about the mental lives of other persons, beliefs we form on the basis of inductive
evidence, and so on. What we need here is a full and appropriately subtle and
sensitive description of the role of experience in the formation of these various
types of beliefs; that project will have to await another occasion, as one says
when one really has no idea how to accomplish the project.
God has therefore created us with an astonishingly complex and subtle establishment of cognitive faculties. These faculties produce beliefs on an enormously
wide variety of topics--our everyday external environment, the thoughts of
others, our own internal life (someone's internal musings and soliloquies can
occupy an entire novel), the past, mathematics, science, right and wrong, our
relationships to God, what is necessary and possible, and a host of other topics.
They work with great subtlety to produce beliefs of many different degrees of
strength ranging from the merest inclination to believe to absolute dead certainty.
Our beliefs and the strength with which we hold them, furthermore, are delicately
responsive to changes in experience-to what people tell us, to perceptual experience, to what we read, to further reflection, and so on.
Now: how shall we think of positive epistemic status from this point of view?
Here is a natural first approximation: a belief has positive epistemic status for
a person only if his faculties are working properly, working the way they ought
to work, working the way they were designed to work (working the way God
designed them to work), in producing and sustaining the belief in question. I
therefore suggest that a necessary condition of positive epistemic status is that
one's cognitive equipment, one's belief forming and belief sustaining apparatus,
be free of cognitive malfunction. It must be functioning in the way it was designed
to function by the being who designed and created us. Initially, then, let us say
that a belief has positive epistemic status, for me, to the degree that my faculties
are functioning properly in producing and sustaining that belief; and my faculties
are working properly if they are working in the way they were designed to work
by God.
The first thing to see here is that this condition-that of one's cognitive
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equipment functioning properly-is not the same thing as one's cognitive equipment functioning normally, or in normal conditions-not, at any rate, if we take
the term 'normally' in a broadly statistical sense. If! give way to wishful thinking,
forming the belief that I will soon be awarded a Nobel Prize for literature, then
my cognitive faculties are not working properlY-4!ven though wishful thinking
may be widespread among human beings. Your belief's being produced by your
faculties working normally or in normal conditions-i.e., the sorts of conditions
that obtain for the most part-must be distinguished from their working properly.
It may be (and in fact is) the case that it is not at all abnormal for a person to
form a belief out of pride, jealousy, lust, contrariness, desire for fame, wishful
thinking, or self-aggrandizement; nevertheless when I form a belief in this way
my cognitive equipment is not functioning properly. It is not functioning the
way it ought to.
I shall have more to say about the notion of proper functioning below. For
the moment, let us provisionally entertain the idea that the one necessary condition
of a belief's having positive epistemic status for me is that the relevant portion
of my noetic equipment involved in its formation and sustenance be functioning
properly. It is easy to see, however, that this cannot be the whole story. Suppose
you are suddenly and without your knowledge transported to an environment
wholly different from earth; you awake on a planet near Alpha Centauri. There
conditions are quite different; elephants, we may suppose, are invisible to human
beings, but emit a sort of radiation unknown on earth, a sort of radiation that
causes human beings to form the belief that a trumpet is sounding nearby. An
Alpha Centaurian elephant wanders by; you are subjected to the radiation, and
form the belief that a trumpet is sounding nearby. There is nothing wrong with
your cognitive faculties; but this belief has little by way of positive epistemic
status for you. Nor is the problem merely that the belief is false; even if we can
add that a trumpet really is sounding nearby (in a soundproof telephone booth,
perhaps, so that it isn't audible to you), your belief will have little by way of
positive epistemic status for you. To vary the example, imagine that the radiation
emitted causes human beings to form the belief, not that a trumpet is sounding,
but that there is a large gray object in the neighborhood. Again, an elephant
wanders by: while seeing nothing of any particular interest, you suddenly find
yourself with the belief that there is a large gray object nearby. A bit perplexed
at this discovery, you examine your surroundings more closely: you still see no
large gray object. Your faculties are displaying no malfunction and you are not
being epistemically careless or slovenly; nevertheless you don't know that there
is a large gray object nearby. That belief has little by way of positive epistemic
status for you.
The reason is that your cognitive faculties and the environment in which you
find yourself are not properly attuned. The problem is not with your cognitive
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facuIties; they are in good working order. The problem is with the environment.
In approximately the same way, your automobile might be in perfect working
order, despite the fact that it will not run well at the top of Pike's Peak, or under
water, or on the moon. We must therefore add another component to positive
epistemic status: your faculties must be in good working order, and the environment must be appropriate for your particular repertoire of epistemic powers.
(Perhaps there are creatures native to the planet in question who are much like
human beings, but whose cognitive powers differ from ours in such a way that
Alpha Centaurian elephants are not invisible to them.)
It is tempting to suggest that positive epistemic status just is proper functioning
(in an appropriate environment), so that one has warrant for a given belief to
the degree that one's faculties are functioning properly (in producing and sustaining that belief) in an environment appropriate for one's cognitive equipment:
the better one's facuIties are functioning, the more positive epistemic status. But
it is easy to see that this cannot be correct. Couldn't it happen that my cogniti ve
faculties are working properly (in an appropriate environment) in producing and
sustaining a certain belief in me, while nonetheless that belief has very little by
way of positive epistemic status for me? Say that a pair of beliefs are (for want
of a better term) productively equivalent if they are produced by facuIties functioning properly to the same degree and in environments of equal appropriateness.
Then couldn't it be that a pair of my beliefs should be productively equivalent
while nonetheless one of them has more by way of positive epistemic status--even
a great deal more-than the other? Obviously enough, that could be; as a matter
of fact it is plausible to think that is the case. Modus ponens has more by way
of positive epistemic status for me than does the memory belief, now rather dim
and indistinct, that forty years ago I owned a second hand 16 gauge shotgun
and a red bicycle with bal100n tires; but both, I take it, are produced by cognitive
facuIties functioning properly in a congenial environment. Although both epistemic justification and being properly produced come in degrees, there seems
to be no discernible functional relationship between them: but then we can't see
positive epistemic status as simply a matter of a belief's being produced by
faculties working properly in an appropriate environment. We still have no real
answer to the question what is positive epistemic status?; that particular frog
is still grinning residually up from the bottom of the mug.
Fortunately there is an easy response. Not only does the first belief, the belief
in the corresponding conditional of modus ponens, have more by way of positive
epistemic status for me than the second; it is also one I accept much more firmly.
It seems much more obviously true; I have a much stronger inclination or impulse
to accept that proposition than to accept the other. When my cognitive establishment is working properly, the strength of the impulse towards believing a given
proposition will be proportional to the degree it has of positive epistemic status-
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or if the relationship isn't one of straightforward proportionality, the appropriate
functional relationship will hold between positive epistemic status and this
impulse. So when my facuIties are functioning properly, a belief has positive
epistemic status to the degree that I find myself inclined to accept it; and this
(again, if my faculties are functioning properly and I do not interfere or intervene)
will be the degree to which I do accept it.
As I see it then, positive epistemic status accrues to a belief B for a person
S only if S' s cognitive environment is appropriate for his cognitive faculties and
only if these faculties are functioning properly in producing this belief in him;
and under these conditions the degree of positive epistemic status enjoyed by B
is proportional to the strength of his inclination to accept B. To state the same
claim a bit differently: a belief B has positive epistemic status for S if and only
if that belief is produced in S by his epistemic faculties working properly (in an
appropriate environment); and B has more positive epistemic status than B* for
S iff (l) B has positive epistemic status for Sand (2) either B* does not or else
S is more strongly inclined to believe B than B*.
II. Eight Objections, Qualifications, or Applications

So far, of course, what 1 have said is merely programmatic, just a picture.
Much more needs to be said by way of qualification, development, articulation.
Let me therefore respond to some objections, make some qualifications and
additions, and mention some topics for further study.
(1) Aren't such ideas as that of working properly and related notions such
as cognitive dysfunction deeply problematic? What is it for a natural organism-a
tree, for example, or a horse-to be in good working order, to be functioning
properly? Isn't "working properly" relative to our aims and interests? A cow is
functioning properly when she gives the appropriate kind and amount of milk;
a garden patch is as it ought to be when it displays a luxuriant preponderance
of the sorts of vegetation we propose to promote. But here it seems patent that
what constitutes proper functioning depends upon our aims and interests. So far
as nature herself goes, isn't a fish decomposing in a hill of corn functioning just
as properly, just as excellently, as one happily swimming about chasing minnows?
But then what could be meant by speaking of "proper functioning" with respect
to our cognitive faculties? A chunk of reality-an organism, a part of an organism,
an ecosystem, a garden patch-"functions properly" only with respect to a sort
of grid we impose on nature-a grid that incorporates our aims and desires.
Reply: from a theistic point of view, of course, there is no problem here. The
idea of my faculties functioning properly is no more problematic than, say, that
of a Boeing 747's working properly. Something we have constructed-a heating
system, a rope, a linear accelerator-is functioning properly when it is functioning
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in the way in which it was designed to function. But according to theism, human
beings, like ropes, linear accelerators and ocean liners, have been designed; they
have been designed and created by God. Our faculties are working properly,
then, when they are working in the way they were designed to work by the being
who designed and created us and them. Of course there may be considerable
room for disagreement and considerable difficulty in determining just how our
faculties have in fact been designed to function, and consequent disagreement
as to whether they are functioning properly in a given situation. There is disease,
disorder, dysfunction, malfunction of the mind as well as of the body. This can
range from the extreme case of Descartes' lunatics (who thought their heads
were made of glass or that they themselves were gourds) to cases where it isn't
clear whether or not cognitive dysfunction is present at all. I stubbornly cling
to my theory, long after wiser heads have given it up as a bad job: is this a
matter of cognitive dysfunction brought about by excessive pride or desire for
recognition on my part? Or is it a perfectly natural and proper display of the
sort of cognitive inertia built into our cognitive faculties (in order, perhaps, that
we may not be blown about by every wind of doctrine)? Or a display of some
other part of our cognitive design whose operation guarantees that new and
unfamiliar ideas will persist long enough to get a real run for their money? Or
what? So there may be great difficulty in discerning, in a particular instance,
whether my faculties are or are not functioning properly; but from a theistic
point of view there is no trouble in principle with the very idea of proper function.
But can a nontheist also make use of this notion of working properly? Is the
idea of proper functioning tightly tied to the idea of design and construction in
such a way that one can use it in the way I suggest only if one is prepared to
agree that human beings have been designed? This is a topic I shall have to
leave for another occasion;6 here let me say just this much. This notion of proper
functioning is, I think, more problematic from a nontheistic perspective-more
problematic, but by no means hopeless. Can't anyone, theist or not, see that a
horse, let's say, suffering from a disease, is displaying a pathological condition?
Can't anyone see that an injured bird has a wing that isn't working properly?
The notions of proper function and allied notions (sickness, dysfunction, disorder,
malfunction and the like) are ones we all or nearly all have and use. If in fact
this notion is ultimately inexplicable or unacceptable from a nontheistic point of
view, then there lurks in the neighborhood a powerful theistic argument--one
that will be attractive to all those whose inclination to accept and employ the
notion of proper function is stronger than their inclinations to reject theism.
(2) Roderick Chisholm7 sees fulfillment of epistemic duty as crucial to positive
epistemic status; in fact he analyzes or explains positive epistemic status in terms
of aptness for fulfillment of epistemic duty. Must we go with him, at least far
enough to hold that a belief has positive epistemic status for me only if I am
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appropriately discharging my epistemic duty in forming and holding that belief
in the way I do form and hold it? This is a difficult question. No doubt there
are epistemic duties, duties to the truth, duties we have as cognitive beings; but
the question is whether a necessary condition of my knowing a proposition is
my violating or flouting no such duties in forming the belief in question. I am
inclined to doubt that there is an element of this kind in positive epistemic status.
It seems that that belief may constitute knowledge even if I am flouting an
intellectual duty in the process of forming and holding it. Suppose I am thoroughly
jaundiced and relish thinking the worst about you. I know that I suffer from this
aberration, and ought to combat it, but do nothing whatever to correct it, taking
a malicious pleasure in it. I barely overhear someone make a derogatory comment
about you; I can barely make out his words, and, were it not for my ill will, I
would not have heard them correctly. (Others thought he said your thought was
deep and rigorous; because of my ill will I correctly heard him as saying that
your thought is weak and frivolous.) In this case perhaps I am not doing my
cognitive duty in forming the belief in question; I am flouting my duty to try to
rid myself of my inclination to form malicious beliefs about you, and it is only
because I am not doing my duty that I do form the belief in question. Yet surely
it seems to have positive epistemic status for me.
Consider another kind of example. Suppose I am convinced by a distinguished
epistemologist that (like everyone else) I have a duty to do my best to try to
bring it about that for every proposition I consider, I believe that proposition if
and only if it is true. Suppose he also convinces me that on most of the occasions
when we form ordinary perceptual beliefs, these beliefs are false. I therefore
undergo a strenuous, difficult regimen enabling me, at considerable cost in terms
of effort and energy, to inhibit my ordinary belief-forming impulses so that I
am able to withhold most ordinary perceptual beliefs. Now suppose I hear a
siren: I take a quick look and am appeared to in the familiar way in which one
is appeared to upon perceiving a large red fire truck. The thought that I must
withhold the natural belief here flashes through my mind. I have been finding
the regimen burdensome, however, and say to myself: 'This is entirely too much
trouble; I am sick and tired of doing my epistemic duty." I let nature take its
course, forming the belief that what I see is a large red fire truck. Then (assuming
that my beliefs do in fact induce in me a duty to try to inhibit the natural belief)
I am forming a belief in a way that is contrary to duty; but don't I nonetheless
know that there is a red fire truck there? I think so. I am therefore inclined to
think that I could know a proposition even if I came to believe it in a way that
is contrary to my epistemic duty. The matter is delicate and unclear, however,
and complicated by its involvement with difficult questions about the degree to
which my beliefs are under my voluntary control. I am inclined to think that
fulfillment of epistemic duty, while of course an estimable condition, is neither

JUSTIFICATION AND THEISM

413

necessary nor sufficient for positive epistemic status; but the relationship between
positive epistemic status and epistemic duty fulfillment remains obscure to me.
(3) If a belief is to have positive epistemic status for me, then my faculties
must be functioning properly in producing the degree of belief with which I hold
A, as well as the belief that A itself. I am driving down a freeway in Washington
D.C.; as I roar by, I catch a quick glimpse of what seems to be a camel in the
median strip; if my faculties are functioning properly, I may believe that I saw
a camel, but I won't believe it very firmly-not nearly as firmly, for example,
as that I am driving a car. If, due to cognitive malfunction (I am struck by a
sudden burst of radiation from a Pentagon experiment gone awry) I do believe
the former as firmly as the latter, it will have little by way of positive epistemic
status for me."
(4) When my epistemic facuIties are functioning properly, I will often form
one belief on the evidential basis of another. The notion of proper function does
not apply, of course, only to basic beliefs, that is, beliefs not formed on the
evidential basis of other beliefs; my faculties are also such that under the right
conditions I will believe one proposition on the basis of some other beliefs T
already hold. I may know that either George or Sam is in the office; you inform
me that Sam is not there; T then believe that George is in the office on the basis
of these other two beliefs. And of course if my faculties are functioning properly,
I won't believe a proposition on the evidential basis of just any proposition. I
won't, for example, believe a proposition on the evidential basis of itself (and
perhaps this is not even possible). I won't believe that Homer wrote the IIliad
on the evidential basis of my belief that the population of China exceeds that of
Japan. Nor will I believe that Feike can swim on the basis of the proposition
that 99 out of 100 Frisians cannot swim and Feike is a Frisian. Proper functioning
here involves believing a proposition on the basis of the right kind of proposition.
(5) A very important notion here is the idea of specifications, or design plan.
We take it that when human beings (and other creatures) function properly, they
function in a particular way. That is, they not only function in such a way as
to fulfill their purpose (in the way in which it is the purpose of the heart to pump
blood), but they function to fulfill that purpose in just one of an indefinitely
large number of possible ways. Our cognitive faculties have been designed, no
doubt, with reliability in mind; they have been designed in such a way as to
produce beliefs that are for the most part true. But they are not designed to
produce true beliefs in just any old way. There is a proper way for them to work;
we can suppose there is something like a set of plans for us and our faculties.
A house is designed to produce shelter-but not in just any old way. There will
be plans specifying the length and pitch of the rafters, what kind of shingles are
to be applied, the kind and quantity of insulation to be used, and the like.
Something similar holds in the case of us and our faculties; we have been designed
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in accordance with a specific set of plans. Better (since this analogy is insufficiently dynamic) we have been designed in accordance with a set of specifications,
in the way in which there are specifications for, for example, the 1983 GMC
van. According to these specifications (here I am just guessing), after a cold
start the engine runs at 1500 RPM until the engine temperature reaches 140
degrees F.; it then throttles back to 750 RPM. In the same sort of way, our
cognitive faculties are designed to function in a certain specific way-a way that
may include development and change over time. It is for this reason that it is
possible for a belief to be produced by a belief producing process that is accidentally reliable. This notion of specifications or design plan is also the source of
counterexamples to the reliabilist claim that a belief has positive epistemic status
if it is produced by a reliable belief producing mechanism. 9
(6) We do have the idea of our cognitive faculties working properly in an
appropriate environment and we also have the idea of positive epistemic status
as what accrues to a belief for someone whose epistemic faculties are thus
functioning properly. Still, there are cases in which our faculties are functioning
perfectly properly, but where their working in that way does not seem to lead
to truth-indeed, it may lead away from it. Perhaps you remember a painful
experience as less painful than it was. (Some say, it is thus with childbirth.) Or
perhaps you continue to believe in your friends honesty after evidence and
objective judgment would have dictated a reluctant change of mind. Perhaps
your belief that you will recover from a dread disease is stronger than the statistics
justify. In all of these cases, your faculties may be functioning just as they ought
to, but nonetheless their functioning in that way does not obviously seem to lead
to truth.
The answer here is simplicity itself: what confers positive epistemic status is
one's cognitive faculties working properly or working as designed to work insofar
as that segment of design is aimed at producing true beliefs. Not all aspects of
the design of our cognitive faculties need be aimed at the production of truth;
some might be such as to conduce to survival, or relief from suffering, or the
possibility of loyalty, and the like. But someone whose holding a certain belief
is a result of an aspect of our cognitive design that is aimed not at truth but at
something else won't properly be said to know the proposition in question, even
if it turns out to be true. (Unless, perhaps, the same design would conduce both
to truth and to the other state of affairs aimed at.)
(7a) consider Richard Swinburne's "Principle of Credulity": "So generally, ... I suggest that it is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of
special considerations) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present,
then probably x is present; what one seems to perceive is probably so. How
things seem to be is good grounds for a belief about how things are."10 This
principle figures into his theistic argument from religious experience: "From this
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it would follow that, in the absence of special considerations, all religious experiences ought to be taken by their subjects as genuine, and hence as substantial
grounds for belief in the apparent object--God, or Mary, or Ultimate Reality or
Poseidon." (254). Swinburne understands this "principle of rationality" in such
a way that it relates propositions: the idea is that on any proposition of the form
S seems (to himselO to be experiencing a thing that is F, the corresponding
proposition of the form S is experiencing a thing that is F is more probable
than not: "If it seems epistemically to S that x is present, then that is good reason
for S to believe that it is so, in the absence of special considerations .... And
it is good reason too for anyone else to believe that x is present. For if e is
evidence for h, this is a relation which holds quite independently of who knows
about e" (p. 260).
To understand Swinburne's thought here we must briefly consider how he
thinks of probability. He accepts a version of the logical theory of probability
developed by Jeffrey, Keynes and Carnap; Swinburne himself develops a version
of this theory in An Introduction to Confirmation Theory". On this theory for
any pair of propositions [A, B] there is an objective, logical probability relation
between them: the probability of A conditional on B (PCA/B». This relation is
objective in that it does not depend in any way upon what anyone (any human
being, anyway) knows or believes; it is logical in that if PCA/B) is n, then it is
necessary (true in every possible world) that PCA/B) is n. (Of course logical
probability conforms to the Calculus of Probability.) Carnap spoke of the probabilistic relation between a pair of propositions as partial entailment; we may
think of the logical probability of A on B as the degree to which B entails A,
with entailment simpliciter as the limiting case. We could also think of the logical
probability of A on B as follows: imagine the possible worlds as uniformly
distributed throughout a logical space: then P(A/B) is the ratio between the
volume of the space occupied by worlds in which both A and B hold to the
volume of the space occupied by worlds in which B holds. And Swinburne's
suggestion, as we have seen, is that on any proposition of the form S seems (to
himselO to be experiencing a thing that is F, the corresponding proposition
of the form S is experiencing a thing that is F is more probable (logically
probable) than not.
I find this dubious. First there are notorious difficulties with the very notion
of probability thought of this way. (I'll mention one a couple of paragraphs
further down.) But second, even if we embrace a logical theory of probability
of this kind we are still likely to have grave problems here. Why suppose that
on the proposition It seems to Paul that Zeus is present it is more probable
than not (probability taken as logical probability) that Zeus really is present?
Here we are not to rely on our having discovered that as a matter of fact most
of what most people think is true; what we must consider is the probability of
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Zeus's presence on the proposition it seems to Sam that Zeus is present alone,
apart from any background knowledge or beliefs we might have. (Alternatively,
this is the case where our background infornlation "consists of nothing but
tautologies", as it is sometimes put.) But if all we have for background information
is tautologies (and other necessary truths) why think a thing like that? Wouldn't
it be just as likely that Sam was mistaken, the victim of a Cartesian demon, or
an Alpha Centaurian scientist, or any number of things we can't even think of?
What would be a reason for thinking this? That in most possible worlds, most
pairs of such propositions are such that the second number is true if the first is?
But is there any reason to think that? (That is, is there any reason apart from
theism to think that; if theism is true, then perhaps most beliefs in most possible
worlds are indeed true, if only because God does most of the believing.)
But there is a quite different way in which we might think of this principle.
Suppose we think of it from the perspective of the idea that positive epistemic
status is a matter of the proper function of our epistemic faculties. It is of course
true that when our faculties are functioning properly, then for the most part we
do indeed believe what seems to us to be true. This isn't inevitable: consider
the Russell paradoxes, where we wind up rejecting what seems true (and what
still seems true even after we see where it leads). A madman, furthermore, might
find himself regularly believing what didn't seem to him true; and an incautious
reader of Kant, intent upon accentuating his free and rational autonomy might
undertake a regimen at the conclusion of which he was able to reject what he
finds himself inclined by nature to believe. But all else being equal, we ordinarily
believe what seems to us to be true, and what seems to us true (when our faculties
are functioning properly in a suitable environment) will have more by way of
positive epistemic status for us than what does not. The explanation, I suggest,
is not that p is logically probable on the proposition p seems to Paul to be true;
the explanation is much simpler: it is the fact that when my faculties are functioning properly, the degree of positive epistemic status a proposition has for
me just is (modulo a constant of proportionality) the degree to which I am
inclined to believe that proposition.
(7b) Similar comments apply to Swinburne's "Principle of Testimony: "the
principle that (in the absence of special considerations) the experiences of others
are probably as they report them" (272). Here again Swinburne apparently understands this principle in terms of his understanding of probability: the proposition
Sam's experience is F is more probable than not, in the logical sense, on the
proposition Sam testifies that his experience is F. But this seems dubious: is
there any reason to think that in most possible worlds in which Sam claims to
have a headache, he really does have a headache? Or that the volume of 'logical
space' occupied by worlds in which Sam testifies that he has a headache and in
fact does, is more than half of the volume of worlds in which Sam testifies that

JUSTIFICATION AND THEISM

417

he does? What could be the basis of such a claim? Swinburne's suggestion is
that if we do not accept principles of this sort, we shall land in the "morass of
skepticism." But we can avoid that morass without accepting these implausible
claims about logical probability. Thomas Reid l2 speaks of "Credulity"-the tendency we display to believe what we are told by others. This tendency is of
course subject to modification by experience: we learn to trust some people on
some topics and distrust others on others; we learn never to fornl a judgment
about a marital altercation until we have spoken to both parties; we learn that
people's judgment can be skewed by pride, selfishness, desire to exalt oneself
at the expense of one's fellows, love, lust and much else. Nonetheless there is
this tendency, and under the right circumstances when you tell me p (that your
name is 'Paul', for example) then (if p is true, and I believe p sufficiently firmly
and my faculties are functioning properly in the formation of this belief) I know
p. And here we need not try to account for this fact in terms of the logical
probability of one proposition on another; we can note instead that (1) when our
faculties are functioning properly, we are typically inclined to believe what we
are told and (2) if we believe what is true and what we are are sufficiently
strongly inclined to believe, then if our faculties are functioning properly (and
the cognitive environment is congenial) what we believe is something we know.
(7c) Finally, consider Swinburne's claim that simplicity is a prime determinant
of a priori or intrinsic probability, at least for explanatory theories: "Prior probability depends on simplicity, fit with background knowledge, and scope. A
theory is simple in so far as it postulates few mathematically simple laws holding
between entities of an intelligible kind ..... I am saying merely that a theory
which postulates entities of an intelligible kind, as opposed to other entities, will
have a greater prior probability, and so, other things being equal, will be more
likely to be true . . . . . . For large scale theories the crucial determinant of prior
probability is simplicity (52-53)." Here Swinburne is speaking of prior probability, not a priori or intrinsic probability: "the prior probability of a theory is the
probability before we consider the detailed evidence of observation cited in its
support" (52). The prior probability of a theory also depends on its fit with our
background knowledge. But if we consider the a priori or intrinsic probability
of the theory, then fit with background information drops outs, so that we are
left with content (or 'scope', as Swinburne calls it in The Existence of God) and
simplicity as the determinants of intrinsic probability; and of these two, it is
simplicity that is the more important: " ... sometimes it is convenient to let e
be all observational evidence and let k be mere 'tautological evidence'. In the
latter case the prior probability P(hlk) will depend mainly on the simplicity of
h (as well as to a lesser extent on its narrowness of scope)" (p. 65).
Now I believe there are real problems here. The chief problem, it seems to
me, is with the very notion of intrinsic, logical probability. On the theory in
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question, as we have seen, for any pair of propositions there is an objective,
logical probability between them. As a special case of this relation we have
intrinsic probability: the probability of a proposition conditional on nothing but
necessary truths. Take such a contingent proposition as Paul Zwier owns an
orange shirt; on this view, there is such a thing as the probability of that
proposition conditional on the proposition 7 +5 = 12. And the problem here is
substantially twofold. In the first place there is no reason, so far as I can see,
to think that contingent propositions do in general have an intrinsic logical
probability; and if they do, there seems to be no way to determine, even within
very broad limits, what it might be.
But second and more important: there are many large classes of propositions
such that there seems to be no way in which intrinsic probability can be distributed
over their members in a way that accords both with the calculus of probability
and with intuition. Consider, for example, a countably infinite set of S of propositions that are mutually exclusive in pairs and such that necessarily, exactly
one of them is true: S might be, for example, the set of propositions such that
for each natural number n (including 0), S contains the proposition there exist
exactly n flying donkeys. Given nothing but necessary truths, none of these
propositions should be more likely to be true than any others; if there is such a
thing as a logical probability on nothing but necessary truths, one number should
be as probable as another to be the number of flying donkeys. But the members
of this countably infinite set can have the same probability only if each has
probability O. That means, however, that the proposition there are no flying
donkeys has intrinsic probability 0; hence its denial-there are some flying
donkeys--has an intrinsic probability of I. Further, according to the Probability
Calculus, if a proposition has an intrinsic probability of I, then its probability
on any evidence is also 1; hence no matter what our evidence, the probability
on our evidence that there are flying donkeys is 1. Still further, it is easy to see
that (under these assumptions) for any number n, the probability that there are
at least n flying donkeys also has an intrinsic probability of 113 and hence a
probability of 1 on any evidence. And of course this result is not limited to
flying donkeys; for any kind of object such that for any number n it is possible
that there be n objects of that kind-witches, demons, Siberian Cheesehoundsthe probability that there are at least n of them (for any n) is 1 on any evidence
whatever. 14
The only way to avoid this unsavory result is to suppose that intrinsic probabilities are distributed in accordance with some series that converges to 0: for
example, there are no flying donkeys has an intrinsic probability of 112, there
is just one flying donkey gets 114, and so on. But then we are committed to
the idea that some numbers are vastly more likely (conditional on necessary
truths alone) than others to be the number of flying donkeys. In fact we are
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committed to the view that for any number n you please, there will be a pair of
natural numbers m and m* such that m* is n times more likely (conditional on
necessary truths alone) to be the number of donkeys than m. And this seems
just as counterintuitive as the suggestion that for any number n you pick, the
probability (on any evidence) that there are at least n flying donkeys is 1.
It therefore seems to me unlikely that such propositions have intrinsic probability at all; but similar arguments can be brought to bear on many other classes
of propositions. Accordingly, I think the whole idea of intrinsic probability is
at best dubious. But even if there is such a thing, why should we suppose that
simpler propositions, all else being equal, have more of it than complex propositions? Is there some a priori reason to suppose that reality prefers simplicity?
Where would this notion come from? Swinburne, again, believes that if we don't
accept some such principle as this, we shall fall into that skeptical bog: if we
don't accept some such principle, we will have no reason for preferring simple
to complex hypotheses, but in many contexts all that our favored hypotheses
have going for them (as compared to others that fit the same data just as well)
is simplicity.
But suppose we look at the matter from the point of view of the present
conception of positive epistemic status. Despite the real problems in saying just
what simplicity is (and in saying in any sort of systematic way when one theory
is simpler than another) there clearly is such a thing as simplicity, and it clearly
does contribute to the positive epistemic status a theory or explanation has for
us. But why think of this in terms of the problematic notion of intrinsic logical
probability? Why not note instead that when our faculties are functioning properly,
we do opt for simple theories as opposed to complex ones (all else being equal);
we can therefore see the greater positive epistemic status of simple theories
(again, all else being equal) as resulting from the fact that when our faculties
are functioning properly, we are more strongly inclined to accept simple theories
than complex ones.
(8) There are presently three main views as to the nature of positive epistemic
status: Chisholmian Internalism, Coherentism, and Reliabilism. The present conception of positive epistemic status as a matter of degree of inclination towards
belief when epistemic faculties are functioning properly-the conception that
seems to me to go most naturally with theism-provides a revealing perspective
from which, as it seems to me, we can see that none of these three views is
really viable. For each we can easily see that the proposed necessary and sufficient
condition for positive epistemic status is not in fact sufficient (and in some cases
not necessary either)-and not sufficient just because a belief could meet the
condition in question but still have little by way of positive epistemic status
because of cognitive pathology, failure to function properly. I don't have the
space here to go into the matter with the proper thoroughness l5 ; I shall say just
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the following.
First, the Chisholmian Intemalist (or at any rate its most distinguished exemplar) sees positive epistemic status as a matter of aptness for epistemic duty
fulfillment. Chisholm begins by introducing an undefined technical locution: 'p
is more reasonable than q for S at t; here the values for p and q will be such
states of affairs as believing that all men are mortal and withholding the belief
that all men are mortal-that is, believing neither the proposition in question
nor its denial. Given 'is more reasonable than' as an undefined locution, he goes
on to define a battery of "terms of epistemic appraisal" as he calls them: 'certain',
'beyond reasonable doubt', 'evident', 'acceptable', and so on. A proposition A
is beyond reasonable doubt for a person at a time t, for example, if it is more
reasonable for him to accept that proposition then than to withhold it; A has
some presumption in its favor for him at t just if accepting it then is more
reasonable than accepting its negation. Now Chisholm introduces "is more reasonable than" as an undefined locution; but of course he intends it to have a sense,
and to have a sense reasonably close to the sense it has in English. In Foundations
of Knowing, his most recent full dress presentation of his epistemology, he says
that "Epistemic reasonability could be understood in terms of the general requirement to try to have the largest possible set of logically independent beliefs that
is such that the true beliefs outnumber the false beliefs. The principles of epistemic
preferability are the principles one should follow if one is to fulfill this requirement. "16 In his earlier Theory of Knowledge Chisholm is a bit more explicit about
intellectual requirements: "We may assume," he says,
that every person is subject to a purely intellectual requirement: that of
trying his best to bring it about that for any proposition p he considers,
he accepts p if and only if p is true 17 ;
and he adds that
One might say that this is the person's responsibility qua intellectual
being . . . One way, then, of re-expressing the locution 'p is more
reasonable than q for S at t' is to say this: 'S is so situated at t that his
intellectual requirement, his responsibility as an intellectual being, is
better fulfilled by p than by q'.
Reasonability, therefore, is a normative concept; more precisely, it pertains
to requirement, duty, or obligation. And Chisholm's central claim here is that
a certain epistemic requirement, or responsibility, or duty, or obligation lies at
the basis of such epistemic notions as evidence, justification, positive epistemic
status, and knowledge itself. To say, for example, that a proposition p is acceptable for a person at a time is to say that he is so situated, then, that it is not the
case that he can better fulfill his epistemic duty by withholding than by accepting
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p; to say that p is beyond reasonable doubt for him is to say that he is so situated,
then, that he can better fulfill his intellectual responsibility by accepting p than
by withholding it. The basic idea is that our epistemic duty or requirement is to
try to achieve and maintain a certain condition-call it 'epistemic excellence'which may be hard to specify in detail, but consists fundamentally in standing
in an appropriate relation to truth. A proposition has positive epistemic status
for me, in certain circumstances, to the extent that I can fulfill my epistemic
duty by accepting it in those circumstances. This duty or obligation or requirement, furthermore, is one of trying to bring about a certain state of affairs. My
requirement is not to succeed in achieving and maintaining intellectual excellence;
my requirement is only to try to do so. Presumably the reason is that it may not
be within my power to succeed. Perhaps I don't know how to achieve intellectual
excellence; or perhaps I do know how but simply can't do it. So my duty is
only to try to bring about this state of affairs.
This is a simple and attractive picture of the nature of justification and positive
epistemic status. I think it is easy to see, however, that it is deeply flawed: for
it is utterly clear that aptness for the fulfillment of epistemic duty or obligation
is not sufficient for positive epistemic status. Suppose Paul is subject to cognitive
dysfunction: then there could be a proposition A that has little by way of positive
epistemic status for him, but is nonetheless such that believing it is maximally
apt for epistemic duty fulfillment for him. Suppose Paul is subject to a cerebral
disturbance that causes far-reaching cognitive dysfunction: when he is appeared
to in one sense modality, he forms beliefs appropriate to another. When he is
aurally appeared to in the way in which one is appeared to upon hearing church
bells, for example, he has a nearly ineluctable tendency to believe that there is
something that is appearing to him in that fashion, and that that thing is orangebright orange. This belief, furthermore, seems utterly convincing; it has for him,
all the phenomenological panache of modus ponens itself. He knows nothing
about this defect in his epistemic equipment, and his lack of awareness is in no
way due to dereliction of epistemic duty. As a matter of fact, Paul is unusually
dutiful, unusually concerned about doing his epistemic duty; fulfilling this duty
is the main passion of his life. Add that those around him suffer from a similar
epistemic deficiency: Paul lives in Alaska and he and all his neighbors have
suffered all their lives from similar lesions due to radioactive fallout from a
Soviet missile test. Now suppose Paul is aurally appeared to in the way in
question and forms the belief that he is being appeared to in that way by something
that is orange. Surely this proposition is such that believing it is the right thing
to do from the point of view of epistemic duty; nevertheless the proposition has
little by way of positive epistemic status for him. Paul is beyond reproach; he
has done his duty as he saw it; he is within his epistemic rights; he is permissively
justified, and more. Nevertheless there is a kind of positive epistemic status this
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belief lacks-a kind crucial for knowledge. For that sort of positive epistemic
status, it isn't sufficient to satisfy one's duty and do one's epistemic best. Paul
can be ever so conscientious about his epistemic duties and still be such that his
beliefs do not have that kind of positive epistemic status.
Clearly enough, we can vary the above sorts of examples. Perhaps you think
that what goes in excels is with satisfying duty is effort; perhaps (in a Kantian
vein) you think that genuinely dutiful action must be contrary to inclination.
Very well; alter the above cases accordingly. Suppose, for example, that Paul
(again, due to cognitive malfunction) nonculpably believes that his nature is
deeply misleading. Like the rest of us, he has an inclination, upon being appeared
to redly, to believe that there is something red lurking in the neighborhood;
unlike the rest of us, he believes that this natural inclination is misleading and
that on those occasions there really isn't anything that is thus appearing to him.
He undertakes a strenuous regimen to overcome this inclination; after intense
and protracted effort he succeeds: upon being appeared to redly he no longer
believes that something red is appearing to him. His devotion to duty costs him
dearly. The enormous effort he expends takes its toll upon his health; he is
subject to ridicule and disapprobation on the part of his fellows; his wife protests
his unusual behavior and finally leaves him for someone less epistemically
nonstandard. Nonetheless he persists in doing what he nonculpably takes to be
his duty. It is obvious, I take it, that even though Paul is unusually dutiful in
accepting, on a given occasion, the belief that nothing red is appearing to him,
he has little by way of positive epistemic status for that belief.
We may therefore conclude, I think, that positive epistemic status is not or is
not merely a matter of aptness for fulfillment of epistemic duty or obligation.
Could it be coherence, as with Lehrer!8 Bonjour!o, and several Bayesians?
Coherentism, of course, comes in many varieties; here I don't have the space
to discuss any of them properly. From the present perspective, however, there
is at least one crucial difficulty with them all: they all neglect the crucial feature
of proper function. According to coherentism, all that is relevant to my beliefs
having positive epistemic status for me is a certain internal relationship among
them. But surely this is not so. Consider, for example, the case of the Epistemically Inflexible Climber. Paul is climbing Guide's Wall, in the Grand Tetons;
having just led the next to last pitch, he is seated on a comfortable ledge, belaying
his partner. He believes that Cascade Canyon is down to his left, that the cliffs
of Mt. Owen are directly in front of him, that there is a hawk flying in lazy
circles 200 feet below him, that he is wearing his new Fire rock shoes, and so
on. His beliefs, we may stipulate, are coherent. Now imagine that Paul is struck
by a burst of high energy cosmic radiation, causing his beliefs to become fixed,
no longer responsive to changes in experience. His partner gets him down the
wall and, in a last ditch attempt at therapy, takes him to the opera in Jackson,
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where the Metropolitan Opera on tour is performing "La Traviata" with Pavarotti
singing the tenor lead. Paul is appeared to in the same way as everyone else
there; he is inundated by waves of golden sound. Sadly enough, the effort at
therapy fails; Paul still believes that he is on the belay ledge at the top of the
next to last pitch of Guide's Wall, that Cascade Canyon is down to his left, that
there is a hawk flying in lazy circles 200 feet below him, and so on. Furthermore,
since he believes the very same things he believed when seated on the ledge,
his beliefs are coherent. But surely they have very little by way of positive
epistemic status for him. Clearly, then, coherence is not sufficient for positive
epistemic status.
I tum finally to reliabilism, the last of the three chief contemporary ideas as
to the nature of positive epistemic status. The view I have suggested in this
paper is closer to reliabilism, especially in the form suggested by William Alston2(),
than to either of the other two; indeed, perhaps you think it is a form of reliabilism.
I don't propose to argue about labels; still, as I see it, that would be less than
wholly accurate. Of course reliability crucially enters into the account I suggest.
According to that account, we implicitly think of positive epistemic status as
involving our faculties' functioning properly; but clearly we wouldn't think of
positive epistemic status in this way if we didn't think that when our faculties
function as they ought, then for the most part they are in fact reliable. Still,
there is more to a belief's having positive epistemic status than its being reliably
produced. There are even more brands of Reliabilism than of Coherentism; and
what is true of one may not be true of another. But the leading idea of at least
many central brands of reliabilism is that a belief has positive epistemic status
if and only if it is produced by a reliable belief producing mechanism or process;
and the degree of its positive epistemic status is determined by the degree of
reliability of the process that produces it. Thus Alvin Goldman: "The justificational status of a belief," he says, "is a function of the reliability of the process
or processes that cause it, where (as a first approximation) reliability consists in
the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false."21
Here there are problems of several sorts; one of the most important is the
dreaded problem of generality, developed by Richard Feldman in "Reliability
and Justification. "22 But there are other problems as well, problems that arise
out of the neglect of the idea of proper function. As we saw above, a crucial
part of our notion of positive epistemic status is the idea of a design plan or
specifications. But then not just any reliable belief producing process can confer
positive epistemic status. Suppose I am struck by a burst of cosmic rays, resulting
in the following unfortunate malfunction. Whenever I hear the word 'prime' in
any context, I form a belief, with respect to one of the first 1000 natural numbers,
that it is not prime. So you say "Pacific Palisades is prime residential area"; or
"Prime ribs is my favorite" or "First you must prime the pump" or "(17') entails
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(14)" or "The prime rate is dropping again" or anything else in which the word
occurs; in each case I form a belief, with respect to a randomly selected natural
number, that it is not prime. This belief producing process or mechanism is
indeed reliable; in the vast majority of cases it produces truth. But it is only
accidentally reliable; it just happens, by virtue of a piece of epistemic serendipity,
to produce mostly true beliefs. And the force of the suggestion that the process
in question is accidentally reliable, I suggest, is just that under the envisaged
conditions my faculties are not working in accordance with the design plan or
the specifications for human beings; that's what makes the reliability in question
accidental reliability. Furthermore, it does not confer positive epistemic status.
Here the process or mechanism in question is indeed reliable; but my belief-that,
say, 41 is not prime-has little or no positive epistemic status. Nor is the problem
simply that the belief is false; the same goes for my (true) belief that 631 is not
prime, if it is formed in this fashion. So reliable belief formation is not sufficient
for positive epistemic status.
By way of conclusion, then: from a theistic perspective, it is natural to see
positive epistemic status, the quantity enough of which is sufficient, together
with truth, for knowledge in the following way: positive epistemic status accrues
to a belief B for a person S only if S's cognitive environment is appropriate for
his cognitive faculties and only if these faculties are functioning properly in
producing this belief in him-i.e., only if his cognitive faculties are functioning
in the way God designed human cognitive faculties to function, and only if S
is in the sort of cognitive environment for which human cognitive faculties are
designed; and under these conditions the degree of positive epistemic status
enjoyed by B is proportional to the strength of his inclination to accept B.
Alternatively: a belief B has positive epistemic status for S if and only if that
belief is produced in S by his epistemic faculties working properly (in an appropriate environment); and B has more positive epistemic status than B* for S iff
B has positive epistemic status for S and either B* does not or else S is more
strongly inclined to believe B than B*. Still another way to put the matter: a
belief B has degree d of positive epistemic status for a person S if and only if
the faculties relevant to producing B in S are functioning properly (in an appropriate environment), and S is inclined to degree d to believe B.
There remains, of course, an enormous amount to be said and an enormous
amount to be thought about. For example: (1) What about God's knowledge?
God is the premier example of someone who knows; but of course his faculties
are not designed either by himself or by someone else. So how shall we think
of his knowledge? The answer, I think, lies in the following neighborhood:
"Working properly" is used analogically when applied to God's cognitive faculties and ours, the analogy being located in the fact that a design plan for a perfect
knower would specify cognitive powers of the very sort God displays. But of

425

JUSTIFICATION AND THEISM

course this notion needs to be developed and worked out in detail. (2) Our
spiritual forebears at Princeton used to speak of the noetic effects of sin. Clearly
(from a Christian perspective) sin has had an important effect upon the function
of our cognitive faculties; but just how does this work and how does it bear on
specific questions about the degree of positive epistemic status enjoyed by various
beliefs? (3) This way of thinking of positive epistemic status, I believe, makes
it much easier to understand the degree of positive epistemic status enjoyed by
moral beliefs and by a priori beliefs; but just what sort of account is correct
here? (4) How, from this perspective, shall we think of the dreaded Gettier
problem? (5) The present account is clearly an externalist account of positive
epistemic status; but how do intemalist factors fit in? (6) From the present
perspective, how shall we think about skepticism? (7) How is the present account
related to the broadly Aristotelian account of knowledge to be found in Medieval
thinkers? (8) How shall we construe epistemic probability-more exactly, how
shall we construe the relationship between A and B when A is a good non-deductive reason for B, or where B is epistemically probable with respect to A? Here
the present account of positive epistemic status is clearly suggestive;23 but how,
precisely, does it work? (9) Over the last few years several philosophers24 have
been arguing that rational belief in God does not require propositional evidence
or argument, that it can be properly basic; how shall we think of that claim from
the present perspective? These and many others are questions for another occasion.
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NOTES
I. See my "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function" in Topics in Philosophy: Vol. II.
Epistemology, ed. James Tomberlin (Northridge: California State University), forthcoming in 1988.
2. See R. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (New York: Prentice Hall. 2nd Edition) pp. Sff.
3. See my "Chisholmian Intemalism" in Philosophical Analysis: A Defense by Example. ed. David
Austin, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1987).
4. Indeed, it is ludicrous understatement to say that God has a grasp of every proposition and
property: from a theistic point of view the natural way to view propositions and properties is as
God's thoughts and concepts. (See my "How to be an Anti-realist", Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Association, Vol. 56, #1, 1983.)
5. In C. S. Lewis' novel Out of the Silent Planet the creatures on Mars are of several different
types displaying several different kinds of cognitive excellences: some are particularly suited to
scientific endeavors, some to poetry and art, and some to interpersonal sensitivity.
6. See my "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function" (footnote 1).
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7. See his Theory of Knowledge, p. 14, and Foundations of Knowing, (Minneapolis: University of
Minneapolis Press, 1982), p. 07. See also my "Chisholmian Internalism" in Philosophical Analysis:
A Defense by Example (above, footnote 3).
8. Must all of my cognitive faculties be functioning properly for any belief to have positive epistemic
status for me? Surely not. And what about the fact that proper function comes in degrees? How well
must the relevant faculties be working for a belief to have positive epistemic status for me? On these
questions see "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function" (footnote 1).
9. See below, pp. 000.
10. The Existence of God (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1979) p. 254. Subsequent references to
Swinburne's work will be to this volume.

11. See R. Swinburne, An Introduction to Confirmation Theory, (London: Methuen & Co, Ltd.,
1973).
12. My whole account of positive pistemic status, not just this example, owes much to Thomas
Reid with his talk of faculties and their functions and his rejection of the notion (one he attributes
to Hume and his predecessors) that self-evident propositions and propositions about one's own
immediate experience are the only properly basic propositions.
13. The proposition there are at least n flying donkeys is equivalent to the denial of (a) There
are 0 flying donkeys or there is just 1 flying donkey, or there are just 2 flying donkeys
or ... there are just n-l flying donkeys. By hypothesis, the probability of each disjunct of (a) is
0; hence by the Additive Axiom the probability of the disjunction is 0, so that the probability of its
denial is 1.
14. See my "The Probabilistic Argument from Evil", Philosophical Studies, 1979.
15. See my "Chisholm ian Internalism" (above, footnote 3) for detailed criticism of Chisholmian
internalism; see my "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Theistic Belief' in Rationality,
Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, ed. William Wainwright and Robert Audi (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986) for detailed criticism of coherentism, and see my "Positive Epistemic Status
and Proper Function" (above, footnote 1) for criticism of reliabilism.
16. p. 07.
17. p. 14.

18. Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
19. Lawrence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1986).
20. See his "Concepts of Epistemic Justification", The Monist, Vol. 68, no. 1 (Jan., 1985) and "An
Tnternalist Externalism" forthcoming in Synthese.
21. "What is Justitied Belief?" in Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, ed.
George Pappas (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), p. 10.
22. The Monist, v. 68, #2 (April, 1985) pp. 159ff.

23. See Richard Otte's "Theistic Conception of Probability", in the present issue.
24. See, for example, William Alston's "Christian Experience and Christian Belief', Nicholas Wolterstorff's "Can Belief in God be Rational if it has no Foundations?", and my "Reason and Belief
in God", all in Faith and Rationality, ed. N. Wolterstorff and A. Plantinga (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1983).

